Putting the Cat Among the Pigeons: The Politics of the Referendum by Ghai, Y
Title Putting the Cat Among the Pigeons: The Politics of theReferendum
Author(s) Ghai, Y
Citation Hong Kong Law Journal, 2004, v. 34 n. 3, p. 433-449
Issued Date 2004
URL http://hdl.handle.net/10722/133106
Rights Creative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License
PUTTING THE CAT AMONG THE PIGEONS:
THE POLITICS OF THE REFERENDUM
The Parable
The epic story started innocently enough, despite dark allegations of intrigue
and conspiracy. On 22 October 2004, when the Panel on Constitutional
Affairs ("the Panel") of the new Legislative Council (LegCo) convened after
the general elections, 58 out of the 60 members of the LegCo showed up,
breaking all records. Although the Interpretation and subsequent Decision of
the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPCSC) earlier
in the year had dampened the movement for constitutional reform and se-
verely restricted the scope of changes for the 2007 executive and 2008
parliamentary elections, the pro-Beijing members were taking no chances.
There would undoubtedly be skirmishes on issues of reform, and they did not
want to be caught off guard, despite what was seen as a shift towards pro-
Beijing parties. The immediate prize was the chair of the Panel under whose
authority democrats would be kept on a leash.
Newly-elected legislator Albert Cheng King-hon takes up the story:
"However, after they had elected an 'acceptable' chairman in Lui Ming-
wah, a member of The Alliance who represents the industrial sector, many
of the conservative legislators reverted to their normal mode of operation,
and soon left after the meeting started. Some preferred to talk on the phone
rather than to listen to the democrats' arguments, while others attended
to their own business. The lack of enthusiasm made it possible for the
democrats to propose a motion calling for a referendum to be held on
universal franchise."'
Conservatives later claimed that the motion was a calculated plot on the
part of the democrats to ambush the country. Having been worsted by the
NPCSC and rebuffed by the electorate, they were opening a new front. Hav-
ing no respect for the rule of law, they were defying the sovereign. The
sovereign itself accused the democrats of plotting to split the country asunder.
No less a person than Lau Nai-keung, a member of the Chinese People's Con-
sultative Conference, was later to accuse the democrats of a "singular obsession"
(but did not share the apocalyptic visions of his friends, telling them that
1 Albert Cheng King-hon, "Too Pampered To Care?" South China Morning Post (hereinafter "SCMP"),
23 Oct 2004.
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these democrats had "empty minds" and history would bypass them).2 These
words conveyed little comfort to the Beijing camp that brought in the legal
guardians of the constitution (with a younger colleague in tow) - and local
and Mainland political heavies - to do battle with enemies obsessed with a
singular obsession.
Albert Cheng, an eyewitness, disagrees with this conspiracy theory.
He said: "the father of all evil" was the Secretary for Constitutional Affairs,
Stephen Lam Sui-lung. Having elected their chap, "the conservatives"
abandoned Lam, no doubt secure in the knowledge that between him and
the new chair, democrats would be taken care of. Lam was in the chamber
because there was some unfinished business from before the elections on
which the Panel wanted a government response - weighty matters like
legislation on political parties, extension of anti-graft legislation to the
chief executive, review of district councils and the scope of the Electoral
Affairs Commission. Albert Cheng continues: "Lam brushed aside all these
issues, saying merely that 'they would be tackled in due course"'. Calling
him a "typical arrogant bureaucrat", Cheng is of the view that Lam's atti-
tude amounted to dereliction of duty (which he claims that even some
government supporters noted).
But worse was yet to come. When questioned on the procedure and time-
table of the Task Force on the Constitution, Lam (being one of the three
members) was "ambiguous" about how the authorities would actually col-
lect public views. He described what the Task Force had done in the past,
which members felt provided an insufficient basis for consultation. Demo-
crats were already feeling that the earlier reports of the Task Force had not
adequately taken into account pro-democracy voices, and on the basis of its
misleading report, the NPCSC had closed off options for reform. Frustrated
by Lam's stonewalling and worried about a similar misrepresentation this
time round, Fernando Cheung Chiu-hung, elected by the social welfare
constituency, tabled the "impromptu" motion that a referendum be held on
how to revise electoral arrangements for the chief executive and LegCo
elections in 2007 and 2008 respectively. Cheng said: "the move was not
meant as a challenge to Beijing. Unlike in Taiwan, a referendum in Hong
Kong would have nothing to do with prompting independence or quasi-
independence".
The account of the reluctant hero (or the villain) of this story corrobo-
rates Cheng's analysis. Cheung said that the motion was also prompted by
Lam's emphasis (as that of Beijing and the chief executive) that reform
2 His ipsissima verba have been recorded. See SCMP, 19 Nov 2004.
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proposals should be built on "consensus" and consensus-building processes.
He said that, judging from the discussion held earlier by the Panel, both the
Task Force and members of the Panel agreed that any proposal on electoral
change should have the consensus and the support of the community at large.
If consensus was the aim, it seemed logical that people should be asked for
their views. That, he claims, was the motive behind his motion which reads
as follows:
"That, as constitutional reform in the HKSAR should have the consensus
and support of the community at large, this Panel requests that the Gov-
ernment should conduct as soon as possible a referendum on the
constitutional reform proposals for 2007 and 2008, and such proposals
should include direct election by universal suffrage."'
He later said that he realised that the referendum would not be legally
binding as there was no law on the matter. His was to be a consultative refer-
endum as "the best means to gauge the views of the public"' and to assist in
developing a consensus and moving the reform process forward. In face of
criticism by Beijing and its Hong Kong supporters, Cheung said he would
consider replacing the word referendum with "public opinion poll" as his in-
terest was in seeking public views to help consensus. He appears to have failed
in his effort to convince Beijing and Tung Chee-hwa of his bona fides and
only intensified their attacks on him and the democrats. Li Gang, deputy
director of the Central Government's Liaison Office, said that supporters of
the referendum were "playing with fire" and "will get burned".' Tung called it
irrelevant, inappropriate and unconstitutional.
However, on that fateful day when the motion was introduced, the newly-
recruited chair of the Panel found himself beleaguered, attracting accusations
of both incompetence and dishonesty. He was criticised for delaying tactics
until the deserting conservatives had been shepherded back into the chamber,
by which time it was too late to hold a vote. There was no vote even during
the following meeting of the Panel (due to prolixity of the debate) and it was
not until 29 November 2004 that a vote was taken. By this time, China had
made abundantly clear its opposition to any form of referendum and the anti-
democracy forces had been marshalled, defeating the motion by 31 votes to
3 Allegations that the decision to move the motion was premeditated are scarcely borne out by the fact
that Cheung had no written version of the motion and formulated it during his speech, in the Chi-
nese language. There ensued a discussion whether an oral motion could be debated and voted on,
while the staff of the Panel hastily prepared a written text (see the record of the proceedings of the
Panel, 20 Oct 2004).
4 See SCMP, 16 Nov 2004.
5 Ibid., 18 Nov 2004.
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20 votes. Cheung declared his intention to organise an unofficial referendum
but he was cautioned by several democrats to be careful.
Interpreting the Parable
This "debate" is typical of previous constitutional "debates" in Hong Kong.
The issues and the legal concepts are seldom defined clearly, much less
explored seriously. There are assertions rather than arguments, providing little
engagement on the issues. Beijing intervenes at an early stage; this is a signal
to its supporters in Hong Kong who, like sycophants, join the fray. Positions
are very quickly polarised and polemicised - henceforth there is no scope for
or interest in examining the grey areas. The wishes of the Central Authori-
ties are read into vague formulations of the Basic Law or NPCSC
interpretations. At some stage Mainland academics close to the Central
Authorities, known as "guardians" of the Basic Law, are wheeled out to say
that this or that is inconsistent with the Basic Law. They seldom provide
substantive arguments. Nor does the NPCSC, but its interpretations and de-
cisions serve as deus ex machina. Sovereignty raises its head - the Hong Kong
government treats this as the trump card. The government's arguments are a
hotchpotch, some law, some policy, threats, pronouncements of the oracle,
moralising, invocations of sovereignty - meaningless in the end (vide Tung's
criticism of the proposal as "inappropriate, inconsistent with established
legal procedures, impractical and misleading the public", "creating divisions
within the community and harming relations with the Mainland" - a sort of
rolled up plea). Even before this happens, we have travelled far from the
Basic Law. The focus shifts rapidly from the morals or rights and wrongs of
arguments to the dangers of offending the sovereign. We are told that we can
avoid dire punishments only by placating the sovereign. Like children, Hong
Kong people are told that, by asking for too much, they stand to lose what
little Beijing might be disposed to throw their way. They are urged to be
reasonable, at least realistic. The end is predictable. It is infinitely depressing.
Terminological Confusion
There was considerable confusion as to the kind of referendum that was
proposed and its consequences. To be fair, this was no fault of Cheung who
repeatedly explained the scope and consequences of his proposal. Many
preferred - for their own reasons - to see in it more than he claimed, or
more than was possible given the lack of a legal framework for referendums.
In this way they expected to destroy the credibility of the proposal. Qiao
Xiaoyang, deputy secretary of the NPCSC, said the concept of referendum
has a "special meaning" (implying law-making, for he wanted to present
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the proposal as a challenge to Beijing). Professor Xiao Weiyun, a "legal guard-
ian" dismissed the whole idea of a non-binding referendum.' Lau Nai-king
said the referendum was against the rule of law since the NPC had made
a binding decision against universal franchise.' Senior Counsel Ronny
Tong said he would have supported the referendum if it did not carry legal
weight.' A curious leader on 3 November 2004 attacked the referendum
but supported a plebiscite when in fact there is no difference in law be-
tween the two - both can be binding or advisory. It seems to assume that a
plebiscite is approval or rejection of a decision, for it said that "a process
that accurately assesses public support for the government's final proposal is
indeed needed" - which is exactly what a referendum can also do.
Frank Ching (an intelligent and usually well-informed commentator)
defined a referendum as "the submission of a law, proposed or already in effect,
to a direct vote of the people", and for that reason opposed the proposal as it
could not be that. Professor Xiao's views that nowhere could a referendum be
held otherwise than by a government, or be advisory, were wrong as a matter
of comparative law - not an infrequent failing of the "guardians". Dr Kwok
Ka-ki, representing the medical constituency, said that a referendum had a
special meaning in constitutional law - which the law in Hong Kong did not
provide for and which was different from a referendum conducted at commu-
nity-level.9 Not for the first time, Cheung acknowledged the absence of a law
and explained his was to be consultative referendum (which presumably did
not require a law).
In fact the referendum can take many forms and can perform a number of
functions. It can seek public opinion in order to assist the government or
parliament to make a decision. Or it can be part of decision-making - and its
results dispositive of an issue. It can come before or after a decision or legisla-
tion on which the public is to be consulted. In the UK, whose constitutional
order is based on parliamentary sovereignty, a referendum can only be used in
this way. It has been used extensively in recent years to determine policies
both on internal devolution and increasing degrees of integration within the
EU. Almost all European states have also used the referendum, either as bind-
ing or advisory, to negotiate their relationship to the EU.
Sometimes the referendum is compulsory and sometimes optional. Some
changes in law, and more frequently in constitutions, can only be made after
6 He said: "If you look around the world, holding referendums are acts of the governments. There is
no such thing as a non-governmental referendum or a referendum with no legal binding force." See
SCMP, 18 Nov 2004.
7 See SCMP, 5 Oct 2004.
8 Ibid., 26 Oct 2004.
9 Ibid., 15 Nov 2004.
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a referendum. Usually the decision to have a referendum is made by the
government or parliament, but it can also be made by the people - if, for
example, a sufficient number of them file a petition that a measure adopted
by the government be referred to voters. Ordinary people can also sometimes
ask that proposals for new laws or amendments be put to a referendum, and if
a sufficient number sign the petition, it has to be held - this is a form of direct
law-making. There are examples of referendums being organised by the people
directly without approval or participation of the government - as a means of
putting pressure on state or international authorities. Referendums played a
critical role in the implosion of the former Yugoslavia and the emergence of
the new political order in the Balkans - as indeed they did in the new Russian
Federation. Quebecois have defied Ottawa in holding referendums in deter-
mining their future relationship with Canada (and have received the
imprimatur of the Supreme Court). Considering all these possibilities,
Cheung's aims were quite modest.
Debating Pros and Cons of the Proposal: The Supporters
But implicit in his proposal was a theory of direct representation. Almost all
contemporary democracies are representative democracies - executive and
legislative decisions are made by persons chosen by the people to represent
them. There are those who, disillusioned by the compromises and betrayals
by chosen representatives, advocate forms of direct democracy - and want to
use all the above types of referendum. The Hong Kong debate not only showed
the general ignorance among the public, politicians and commentators, of
the range and specificity of referendums, but also was singularly lacking in
any debate on the relative merits of indirect (representative) and direct
democracy. There is a fairly large literature on this subject, central to the
development of political and constitutional theory, which canvasses the
strengths, weaknesses and tendencies of both types. In general, governments
and politicians do not like the referendum except when it lets them off the
hook of making difficult, unpopular decisions - referendums qualify their own
powers, and may trigger off a sequence of claims and events which may not
suit them. Referendums are empowering of the people and turn them from
passive to active subjects of politics, but they are also problematic, not so
good for consensus building, and give considerable scope to prejudices. A
referendum, whatever its legal nature, can have consequences for attitudes,
empowerment, and for shaping aspirations. None of these elements entered
the Hong Kong debate.
No one, least of all the government of the People's Republic of China,
wanted to be seen to be denigrating the wisdom of the people. For both Beijing
and Tung's administration, exploring the implications of referendum would
have been both uncomfortable and inconvenient. The Chinese Constitution
(2004) HKLJ438 Yash Ghai
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does not even have representative democracy, and the Basic Law only
partially so (the current method for nomination of candidates for the chief
executive, even if elections were direct, would fatally weaken the claim of
representation). Better to stay away from the murky, indeed dangerous,
waters of democratic political theory (more on this later). Why more was not
made of this by the democrats, despite the constraints of the Basic Law and
the NPCSC interpretations, remains intriguing.
The case for the democrats was based on the inadequacy of public consul-
tations by the Task Force. Its reports had failed to indicate accurately the
depth of public support for universal franchise; instead it had given the
impression that the public was deeply divided on this issue (its style was to
state: "some people said this, some said that" without any quantitative analysis).
Some felt that it was on the basis of its misleading reports, that the Standing
Committee had made its restrictive ruling. A referendum would correct this
error and provide the basis for a re-consideration. Lam had indeed asserted
that the Standing Committee had taken public views into account, but Mar-
tin Lee wondered, if this was the case, why did the Committee not state this
in its Decision." The relevance of public opinion was not otherwise suffi-
ciently canvassed. The criteria for deciding on constitutional reform that the
chief executive submitted to the NPC and which it accepted, attach no spe-
cial importance to public opinion. Yet who is then to decide on the impact of
other, seemingly more objective, criteria? Tung's statement is, to say the least,
ambiguous on this - on which more later.
The strongest support came from the Human Rights Front and the Catho-
lic Church. The convenor of the Front, Chung Chung-fai said:
"The community has no way to express its demands after exhausting all
means, including demonstrations, signature campaigns and petitions. The
government has not responded to the public demand, and a referendum is
the only way".
Bishop Zen of the Catholic Church said that Beijing should not be afraid
of the people. "Everything should start with the people. There is no way the
people are not involved in the process." The call for a referendum was a reac-
tion to lack of democracy and frustration at the disregard of popular opinion.
Not all democrats supported the referendum proposal - although none of
them opposed universal suffrage or the importance of public opinion. They
were no doubt influenced by the fact that public opinion had already
expressed itself in the recent general elections where 62 per cent of the voters
supported parties that were committed to universal franchise. Some thought
10 Ibid., 30 Nov 2004.
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that no referendum could change the decision of the NPCSC and so it was
better to focus on long-term strategies. Others may have considered the
moment unpropitious when Beijing seemed ready for talks with the democrats.
The very, although possibly just apparent, opening offered by Beijing
produced a concern with "being realistic and practical". Others were daunted
by consideration of the practical difficulties and expenses of holding a non-
official referendum (although Bishop Zen offered the facilities of Catholic
schools for polling purposes and other assistance). The Human Rights Front
has expressed its support for a non-official referendum, and Leung Kwok-
hung (also known as "Long Hair"), has promised to introduce legislative
proposals on a referendum. Albert Ho said: "There is a demand for a referen-
dum because many Hong Kong people's views have been trampled upon"."
The former Chief Secretary, Anson Chan, a democrat with reservations
on the referendum, spoke against it on 25 October 2004, urging people to be
realistic and practical, saying that it was more productive to concentrate on
when and how universal franchise would be fully introduced. She cautioned
that more trust and accommodation was needed on "both sides" to deal with
"a clash in culture and values". Her concern, that the politics of the referen-
dum would detract from the critical questions of timing and substance, were
echoed by others. In an op-ed newspaper article,12 Professor Anthony Cheng
Bing-leung, expressing his reservations, emphasised the need to think strate-
gically and prepare responses to the expected proposals of the government:
"makes better sense than engaging in a prolonged but fruitless referendum
debate ... The worst scenario would be an informal referendum done in a
messy manner that discredits the pro-democracy camp and yet fails to bring
us any closer to substantive progress in constitutional reform".
Frank Ching took a similar position. If a private referendum was held, the
only option since Tung had rejected an official one, the cost and the effort
would be massive (the postage alone would cost HK$8.9 million) and the
results could be manipulated. He said:
"An elaborate attempt to prove that the electorate still supports universal
suffrage in 2007 and 2008 will be interpreted by Beijing as a challenge to
its authority. The thing to do now is aim for 2012. And a massive effort to
determine if the majority of Hong Kong voters supports such a move is a
worthwhile project.""
" Ibid., 8 Nov 2004.
12 Ibid., 3 Nov 2004.
13 Ibid., 13 Nov 2004.
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Three democratic legislators representing functional constituencies with-
drew support for the referendum on 14 November 2004 because they
considered that Hong Kong people did not understand it (and had not called
for it). An SCMP leader on 3 November 2004 called the referendum a "waste
of time and money" that would "harden Beijing's attitude to democracy". But
it faulted the Task Force for underrating democratic aspirations and expressed
the need for better ways of gauging public opinion.
Debating Pros and Cons of the Proposal: The Opponents
The Central Authorities and the Tung administration are the principal
opponents of the proposal, supported by that loose coalition of parties, groups
and individuals who are frequently referred to as "pro-Beijing". The busi-
ness community are often a part of this group although of late there are
divisions among them, and some have come out in favour of
universal franchise. Stephen Lam immediately repudiated the idea of a ref-
erendum when it was first proposed by Cheung. Beijing itself was quick to
attack it. On 24 October 2004, Beijing formally rejected the proposal. On
2 November 2004, Tung made an uncompromising statement, ruling out
even a non-official referendum." Predictably, a chorus of protests followed,
intense lobbying of legislators took place and a sufficient number were
mobilised to defeat the motion on 29 November 2004.
The principal argument against the referendum is that it is unconstitutional,
being against the Basic Law and against the PRC Constitution. No very pre-
cise arguments have been advanced. It is said that the referendum would go
against the procedure for the amendment of the Basic Law or the electoral
provisions set out in the Basic Law. It is also pointed out that the Basic Law
does not provide for a referendum of any kind. It has also been argued that as
the proposal during the drafting of the Basic Law for a referendum on further
constitutional reform was rejected, the Basic Law prohibits it. Gao Siren,
director of the Central Government Liaison Office, said: "any attempt at a
referendum - no matter how it was carried out or packaged - breached the
Basic Law".
Another constitutional argument is that the referendum would violate
the interpretation and decision of the NPCSC, which had outlawed full suf-
frage for 2007 and 2008 and which the HKSAR had no power to disregard.
Tung said that the NPCSC had made its decision "strictly in accordance with
legal procedures after consulting various sectors in Hong Kong ... The NPCSC
14 He said: "The SAR government will neither hold a referendum on universal suffrage nor approve any
local (political and social) organization's plan to encourage citizens to participate in and seek the
referendum." See China Daily, 2 Nov 2004.
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is the highest organ of state power [actually it is the NPC]. The HKSAR must
abide by and implement this decision". He said: "using a referendum to
reverse the decision of the NPCSC is against the Basic Law". Professor Xu
Chongde said: "it is inappropriate for the lawmakers, who have sworn
allegiance to the Basic Law, to push for a referendum after a decision was
made by the NPCSC"." Others too have referred to the oath of office as
imposing an obligation for those who have sworn it not to go against the
Basic Law (but presumably this obligation rests on everyone), Professor Wang
adding that it was a disrespect to the Basic Law.16
A frequent criticism is that the proposal to hold the referendum is a "chal-
lenge to the Central Authorities". On 15 November 2004, Gao said that the
referendum proposal was a "challenge to the country's political and constitu-
tional system. We express grave concern over it". Qiao Xiaoyang said the
proposal was a "challenge" to the Central Authorities. Professor Xu said that
the essence of the pro-democracy camp's call for a referendum, no matter
how it was defended, was to mount a challenge to the central government. It
is not entirely clear what is meant by "challenge" to the national system or
central authorities. It could mean merely the expression of a different point
of view from that of the Central Authorities, or questioning a decision of the
Central Authorities, or an act of disobedience and a breach of the law. Per-
haps all these are implied - and they are perhaps also connected to the frequent
statement that the PRC is sovereign over the HKSAR. Perhaps this last is
implied in Tung's statement that the NPCSC is the highest organ of state
power, and is implicit in Gao's remark that "the so-called referendum
motion" was inconsistent with the legal status of the HKSAR stipulated by
the Basic Law (views echoed by Tung)." Professor Xu has also referred to the
application of the "national system" (which presumably means that it is supe-
rior to that of the HKSAR). " Professor Wang Zemin, a new "guardian", said
that there was no point to the referendum as Beijing has the final say on
constitutional development, and in any case it was "irresponsible". 19
15 See SCMP, 18 Nov 2004.
16 Ibid., 20 Oct 2004.
17 He said: "Constitutional changes in Hong Kong have a strong bearing on national sovereignty and
are not an issue that Hong Kong can determine by itself through a referendum." See China Daily, 3
Nov 2004. Donald Tsang was even more explicit: "International law prohibits the infringement of a
country's territorial integrity and sovereignty through referendums under any circumstances. Since
all the powers Hong Kong enjoys derive from the central government, a referendum that challenges
the central government and national sovereignty is out of the question." See China Daily, 21 Oct
2004. In fact many systems allow the autonomous region to make its own constitution, and this is in
no sense seen as a breach of state sovereignty. Perhaps Tsang was misquoted because there is no such
international law. Quite the contrary, as referendums and autonomy are becoming very important
ways to accommodate diversity.
18 See SCMP, 18 Nov 2004.
19 Ibid., 20 Oct 2004.
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Other arguments are more oriented towards pragmatic considerations. Tung
said that the referendum would damage the cordial relations between the
Central Authorities and the HKSAR. It would divide the community in Hong
Kong. It would harm the interests of Hong Kong people and obstruct "the
gradual and orderly" progress of constitutional development.20 He also said:
"it will not help promote the healthy development of democracy in Hong
Kong" although it is not reported why he thought so. He criticised the pro-
posal as "inappropriate, inconsistent with established legal procedures,
impractical and misleading the public".21 Donald Tsang said that it would
affect efforts towards consensus, was a waste of time and energy - "a needless
distraction for the community"; and anyway, the government would not heed
democrats' demands.22 Yip Kuk characterised pushing the referendum as
"playing with fire". Why all this over-reaction, to puny Hong Kong when the
whole world seems to be cowering before China's economic prowess? I did
think of an alternative title for this comment, "The Mouse That Roared"!
Evaluating the Debate
The case for the referendum was weakened by the fact that general elections
had recently been held where, while the issue of electoral reforms for 2007
and 2008 was pretty well ruled out, it was clear that a substantial majority of
voters supported universal franchise. There seemed little point in demon-
strating this again, even though the government insisted that opinion was
divided and would not recognise the majority. Again, the supporters of the
referendum were not able to show how the referendum would affect the deci-
sions or the decision-making process on reform (especially if the referendum
was to be non-official), and most people assumed that Beijing would not go
back on the NPCSC interpretation. Tung's criteria for constitutional progress
did not rate people's views highly. But the supporters could argue that the
opinions of the people were critical to the assessment of other criteria (as
people were not to be offered simply a choice for or against universal franchise).
Moreover the experience of the referendum, engaging the people, parties and
social groups, in an intensive way, would itself help to supply a desideratum
alleged in Tung's report to be absent - the political maturity of Hong Kong
people and political parties. The absence of details on the administration of
the referendum may also have affected people's understanding of it.
The debate was confined to politicians and seems not to have been
explained or taken to the public. People needed to understand the implica-
tions of the referendum (and some of its machinery) before they could engage
20 Ibid., 8 Nov 2004.
21 Ibid., 15 Nov 2004.
22 Ibid., 19 Oct 2004.
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with the controversy. People do not really understand the intricacies of
referendums, neither the previous nor the current "sovereign" having, for
legal or political reasons, much time for referendums. Even in the dying days
of its rule, when, only, colonial powers can be agreeable to referendums,
Britain denied it to Hong Kong people, ending instead with a shameful,
manipulative process to validate the Sino-British Declaration.
Nor was the post-election context in which all groups sought openings to
Beijing (astutely exploited by the Central Government) receptive to what
was portrayed as "singular obsession" or show of aggression. The focus on the
proposals for a referendum in Taiwan stirred and muddied the waters and
enabled the pro-Beijing group to present the proposal as pregnant with seces-
sion - although it was evident to most that the two proposals were quite
different. But, as I show later, the proponents did not feel able to argue their
real motives and case - just as the pro-Beijing camp was not able. But the
supporters, divided to some extent among themselves on strategy, allowed
the Beijing camp to establish the framework of the debate. Eric Cheung Tat-
ming23 repeatedly made the point that the Basic Law did not prohibit
referendum, and thus allows it, as did Margaret Ng." But few systematic
arguments were based on the rights and freedoms guaranteed in the Basic
Law - the freedoms of expression, association, assembly, procession and dem-
onstration and right to demand accountability from public authorities.
The case of the opponents is more revealing. They built their case by
constantly misrepresenting the nature of the proposed referendum, including
on the eve of the second vote in the Panel (15 November 2004). Cheung
accused Gao of misleading the public by saying that the democrats were try-
ing to conduct a "legally binding referendum" to overturn Beijing's April
Decision. In fact, the referendum was to be no part of a formal decision-
making process. In that sense it did not detract from the Basic Law. But it
would provide arguments and evidence that could assist in decision-making,
and indeed, in any sensible process, should be used. It was not to usurp the
functions of any state institutions - indeed the Basic Law assumes that there
would be consultations and the seeking and finding of public views (and the
absence of a reference to such consultations is no bar to them, any more than
it should be to a referendum). It would also demonstrate how politically
mature or otherwise were the voters of Hong Kong.
The assertions about "challenge to the central authorities" were more like
threats than legal arguments - and in fact no legal arguments seem to have
23 Ibid., 18 Nov 2004.
24 In a Letter to Hong Kong, she said: "while the Basic Law does not contain provisions for a referendum,
it does not mean Hong Kong cannot hold a non-binding vote to gauge public opinion ... The refer-
endum proposed violates no article in the Basic Law. What it does is to allow each and every person
in Hong Kong to speak for himself, directly and unequivocally, without the results being distorted by
loaded questions or through an arbitrary interpretation." See The Standard, 22 Nov 2004.
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been placed in the public domain. Evident again was the tendency of the
Beijing camp to term all differences of view from it on the Basic Law attacks
on China. What was being demanded was obsequiousness and submission.
What else was the point of constant references to the "dangers of upsetting
the central authorities", not damaging "cordial relations", "playing with fire"
and "losing what is realistic in the search for more"? What is the significance
of the unending mantra of "consensus" (at a time when the NPCSC closes
doors to a consensus and Beijing is refusing to meet democrats it does not
like) other than to submit to Beijing's will? This submission is secured not
only by veiled (but not so subtle) threats but also through appeals to legality
- thus the constant references to the Basic Law or the "national system", the
finality of the interpretations of the NPCSC and the supremacy of the NPC
(and the wheeling out of "legal guardians" and resort to threadbare arguments
about even oaths of office). Much of the controversy was used to reinforce
the status of the NPCSC and the legal powers of the Central Authorities, and
to strengthen the force of the NPCSC interpretation and decision on consti-
tutional reform - the paucity of precise legal points notwithstanding (maybe
it was not a coincidence that a newspaper" recommended that interpreta-
tions of the NPCSC should be annexed to the Basic Law so that their authority
becomes obvious to all). The acquiescence of the Tung administration and
the pro-China lobby in these tactics and interpretations bodes ill for the
remaining vestiges of Hong Kong's autonomy. Experience shows that each
time there is a controversy about Hong Kong's relations with the Central
Authorities, Hong Kong is diminished.
Explaining the Debate
To understand these happenings, it is necessary to start with the scheme of
the Basic Law. It is usual to think of the Basic Law as an instrument of
autonomy, and indeed the Basic Law claims one of its principles a high
degree of autonomy. But it also possible to see the Basic Law essentially as the
entrenchment of an economic, social and political system. A close examina-
tion of the scheme of the Basic Law and the operation of "one country two
systems" suggests that autonomy is not its defining characteristic. As far as
the substantive aspect of the "system" is concerned - the powers and func-
tions to be exercised in Hong Kong - autonomy is circumscribed by a number
of general principles and specific rules prescribed in the Basic Law. As far as
the institutional aspect is concerned - the distribution of powers and the
25 See China Daily, 22 Nov 2004.
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rules for decision-making - the degree of democracy and the power of the
Central Authorities to intervene in Hong Kong means that the ultimate
control is vested in the Central Authorities. The result is that while Hong
Kong institutions are vested with powers greater than any federal or autonomy
system, leaving precious little for the Central Authorities, its institutional
autonomy is severely limited. Indeed it was possible for China to formally
vest these extensive "powers and functions" in Hong Kong precisely because
it retained control over institutions and the decision-making process. China
therefore regarded the institutional question as more critical than the devo-
lution of powers. This is contrary to the experience of other autonomy systems
where there are long and difficult negotiations about the division of powers
but relatively little about institutions - indeed the autonomous region is gen-
erally left to draft, adopt and amend its own constitution.
The Central Authorities have sought control or influence over institu-
tions principally through restrictions on generally accepted constitutional
principles, especially principles of autonomy. The central piece of the scheme
is the office of the chief executive in whom are vested all the powers of the
executive of the HKSAR - it is fashionable to describe the Hong Kong gov-
ernmental system as "executive led". The relationship between the chief
executive and the legislature is tilted in favour of the former - the chief
executive can veto legislation, dissolve the legislature once in a term in case
of conflict with the legislature, and can prevent the submission of legislative
bills relating to government policies by members of the legislature. Members
cannot introduce bill or other motions dealing with public expenditure,
political structure or the operation of the government. The composition and
procedure of the legislature are designed to assist the chief executive, princi-
pally through a large majority of functional constituency members whose
election by small electorates easy to influence or control by the Central
Authorities, and chosen from sectors who can be expected to support the
government. The dominant influence of these members is facilitated through
a complex system of voting in which they act as a second chamber, voting
separately from the directly elected members, and thus have a veto over all
initiatives of legislators. Research on the voting pattern shows the heavy
dependence of the government on functional constituency members.
Having created such a powerful office, it was necessary to ensure the con-
trol of this office by the Central Government - which it has done by rules of
appointment and removal leaving the final word with itself, particularly nomi-
nation and election through a small committee, easily controlled. The result,
along with the provision that the chief executive is accountable to the Cen-
tral Government, is that he or she is accurately regarded as its creature. The
maintenance of these, or broadly similar, electoral rules for the executive and
the legislature (and the latter's procedure) is critical to the scheme of the
Central Government.
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However, two kinds of development could threaten it. The first is a time
bomb placed in Articles 45 and 68 (dealing with the election of the chief
executive and the legislature, respectively). These adopt elections by univer-
sal franchise as the ultimate aim and in Annexes I and II set out a programme
and procedure for progress towards it. It was the conflict between those
requiring or resisting that decisive steps be taken towards this goal in 2007
and 2008 (as was the expectation to happen) that led to the intervention of
the Central Authorities through a NPCSC interpretation ruling out any real
move to full democracy.
The second development could have been, and has become, popular dis-
content with the government and the rules which sustain its dominance over
the legislature and subordination to the Central Authorities. Such discon-
tent was not difficult to predict as it was obvious that the Central Authorities
intended to work with the tycoons of Hong Kong who had interest in neither
constitutional reform nor progressive social policies, and the people had no
choice in the appointment of the chief executive. The most popular political
parties were doomed to remain perpetually out of power or even influence.
Frustration with "constitutional politics", the disregard of their interests, and
the ineptitude of the Hong Kong administration led the people to lobby out-
side the framework of formal institutions (a dialectical reaction that Marxists
should have been alert to). This was most powerfully demonstrated on 1 July
2003 when over half a million people marched to protest against government
policies and to demand constitutional politics. Popular politics had mush-
roomed and the Central Authorities were neither prepared for it nor did they
know how to deal with it. They were handicapped by the total lack of expe-
rience of popular or democratic politics on the Mainland - but they could not
use Mainland tactics to suppress these populist impulses because of the con-
stitutional protection of rights and the watchful eyes of the outside world.
The Central Government opted for policies of economic assistance through
promotion of Mainland tourists to Hong Kong, economic integration, and
greater direct engagement in Hong Kong affairs - and a modicum of charm.
Having, through massive intervention, ensured a victory of sorts for its side
in the general elections in September 2004, it heaved a sigh of relief - only to
be hit on the convening of the new legislature through the proposal of a
referendum. Here was the hydra-headed people raising its heads again. The
Central Government opposed the referendum because in it and through it,
the Central Government saw the popularisation of politics and a crisis of
formal structures of state. The NPCSC interpretation introducing further
restrictions on reform and clamping down on democratic forces produced
great resentment. The constitution review process, which looked increasingly
manipulated and driven from the Mainland, added to the frustration and anger.
Already there were other manifestations of popular initiatives which bypassed
the executive and the legislature - campaigns for the protection of the harbour,
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reform of property development policies, preservation of flats in Hunghom,
the abandonment of plans to sell off public properties, and to develop a
cultural centre in West Kowloon. These campaigns built up such a head of
steam that the government had sometimes to relent - which showed the weak-
ness of administration and the lack of firm policies or the ability to see them
through. The Central Authorities might have found it easier to manage the
transition to more democratic institutions; for the establishment parliamen-
tary politics are easier to cope with than street politics. It will be much harder
now to contain populist politics, which have a new lease of life in reaction to
the government's obduracy.
Beijing's disquiet about the referendum is thus connected with the defi-
ance of its authority and the rise of popular politics operating outside the
formal framework of the Basic Law. It probably realises that even a consulta-
tive referendum will have major consequences - further politicisation of the
people and of civil society, upsetting the balances between different interest
groups within Hong Kong built into the Basic Law and thus making it harder
to neutralise or manage popular politics. This point is not lost on some
supporters of the referendum. Indeed its principal proponent, Cheung, is
quoted as saying that "my recent proposal is a form of social movement which
is also fuelled by my refusal to back down. I believe that we should think
outside the box, instead of only listening to the top command and doing
nothing".26 Undoubtedly, many others think in the same way - although
they may prefer not to articulate it in quite this way.
The experience of the use of popular referendums in Quebec and Eastern
Europe, which led to the development of new ideas of self-government and
gave a standing to communities is probably not lost on Beijing. In a reference
to the Supreme Court by the Canadian government on whether Quebec had
a right to self-government, the Court answered it, sort of, in the affirmative,
if some conditions were met. First, that a clear majority of the Quebec people
showed in a referendum support for a clear question on self-determination.
This itself left many questions open. Second, if this happened, the govern-
ment would have to negotiate with Quebec to settle differences between
Quebec and the rest of Canada. The settlement could take the form of greater
autonomy for Quebec - but it could also result in a negotiated separation.
The moral and political message of the judgment is that understandings
and negotiations are more effective ways to deal with identity and discontent
than strong-arm tactics. In fact, Quebec politics have already taken a turn
towards greater acceptance of its role in Canada. It would be a great shame if
26 See SCMP, 8 Nov 2004.
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Beijing misread that judgment or the people of Hong Kong. It is understand-
able that a Leninist regime in power for over half a century should find it
difficult to come to terms with democratic politics. But Beijing has no other
alternative. The Basic Law has many virtues but it is also a deeply flawed
instrument. It shows an amazing distrust of the people. It is also incredibly
rigid - for example, the chief executive can, and has said he would, veto even
the introduction in the LegCo of Leung Kwok-hung's bill on the referendum.
Beijing has seldom given Hong Kong people a real opportunity to debate its
future in a free, frank and rational manner. All debates have been hijacked,
circumscribed and the people divided on spurious grounds. Hong Kong people
are mature, responsible, anxious for compromise, and for the most part strongly
committed to their destiny as part of China; they deserve to be treated with
greater respect.
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